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On the Feasibility and Efficacy of
Protection Routing in IP Networks
Kin-Wah Kwong, Lixin Gao, Fellow, IEEE, Roch Guérin, Fellow, IEEE, and Zhi-Li Zhang

Abstract—With network components increasingly reliable,
routing is playing an ever greater role in determining network
reliability. This has spurred much activity in improving routing
stability and reaction to failures, and rekindled interest in
centralized routing solutions, at least within a single routing
domain. Centralizing decisions eliminates uncertainty and many
inconsistencies, and offers added flexibility in computing routes
that meet different criteria. However, it also introduces new
challenges; especially in reacting to failures where centralization
can increase latency. This paper leverages the flexibility afforded
by centralized routing to address these challenges. Specifically,
we explore when and how standby backup forwarding options
can be activated, while waiting for an update from the centralized
server after the failure of an individual component (link or
node). We provide analytical insight into the feasibility of such
backups as a function of network structure, and quantify their
computational complexity. We also develop an efficient heuristic
reconciling protectability and performance, and demonstrate its
effectiveness in a broad range of scenarios. The results should
facilitate deployments of centralized routing solutions.
Index Terms—Network, routing, protection, standby.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Intra-domain routing in IP networks has traditionally relied
on distributed computations among routers, with the concatenation of individual forwarding decisions eventually resulting
in packet delivery. In spite of their inherent adaptability and
scalability, distributed computations can make troubleshooting
harder, because of the many sources of inconsistencies they
allow. This has renewed interest in centralized routing solutions [7], [9], [27] for IP networks, at least in settings where
scalability is less of a concern, e.g., intra-domain routing.
Centralizing decisions not only guarantees full visibility into
the forwarding state of individual routers (now essentially
cheap forwarding engines or FEs), it also affords added
flexibility in computing paths that meet different requirements.
In spite of its advantages and even when scalability is not an
issue, centralizing decisions has disadvantages. Of particular
concern for reliability is latency in reacting to failures, i.e.,
the central server needs to be notified, react to the failure, and
communicate updated forwarding information to all affected
FEs. This can result in non-negligible “gaps” after failures,
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during which FEs have no valid forwarding states for some
destinations, and translate into substantial packet losses. Given
the sub-50ms target for failure recovery (including routing
failures) that many modern applications mandate and the fact
that several distributed routing solutions are able to meet this
target, it is imperative for a centralized routing system to
demonstrate similar capabilities. Developing solutions that can
achieve this goal is one of the paper’s motivations. A natural
approach to the problem is through preventive mechanisms,
e.g., by having the central server pre-compute forwarding
decisions for common (most) failure scenarios, and pre-load
those in the FEs so that updated forwarding state is locally
available. However, such solutions have their limitations. For
one, the sheer volume of alternate forwarding states across
failure scenarios will likely require that it be stored in “slow”
memory to keep costs low. As a result, updating data path
forwarding tables could take time. More importantly, even
if the central server does not have to download updated
forwarding state, it remains responsible for coordinating when
and which FEs switch-over to the new state. As discussed
in [19], failure to do so can introduce forwarding loops, whose
effect can be worse than failures.
Ensuring uninterrupted (or minimally interrupted) packet
forwarding in the presence of failures remains, therefore,
a significant challenge in centralized routing systems. Our
goal in this paper is to explore a possible solution to this
problem, and in the process take centralized routing one step
closer to offering an effective alternative for intra-domain
routing. Furthermore, because a corollary of centralized routing is simplified FEs, we seek to realize this goal with no
or minimal impact on data plane complexity. In particular,
we want to avoid either encapsulation-based solutions that
require additional packet manipulations, as well as packet
marking and interface-specific forwarding solutions that often
call for significant expansion to the size (and therefore cost) of
forwarding tables. Instead, our goal is to allow all (most) FEs
to have, for each destination present in their forwarding tables,
a pre-configured next-hop to which packets for that destination
can be forwarded in case of failure of the primary next-hop(s).
The trigger to switch to backup forwarding is entirely local
(i.e., unavailability of the primary next-hop(s)), and forwarding
loops should be precluded.
In other words, we consider an IP network where (intradomain) routing is under the responsibility of a central server,
so that routers (FEs) are only responsible for (destinationbased) packet forwarding. Because of the use of a central
server, path computation is not restricted to shortest paths
based on a common set of link weights. Instead, each desti-
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nation prefix is associated with an “independently” computed
(primary) forwarding tree (more generally a directed acyclic
graph, or DAG), rooted at the egress node associated with
the destination. Our goal is then to compute a set of primary
routing trees (or DAGs), one for each destination, so that all
nodes in the tree, or when not feasible1 as many nodes as
possible, have a standby alternate next-hop available when
the primary next-hop becomes unreachable2 . We term such
a routing, protection routing, and introduce it more formally
in Section III. Protection routing is readily realized when
each node in the DAG has two or more independent nexthops towards the destination, e.g., as sought in [24], [20].
Its simplicity not withstanding, this is easily shown not to
be simultaneously feasible for all nodes (at least one node
is limited to only one next-hop). Furthermore, it ignores the
option for two nodes to mutually protect each other, and
exploring the benefits this affords is one of the motivations for
this paper. In addition, while standby protection to failures is
desirable, its impact on operational performance should also
be accounted for. Incorporating this aspect when computing
protection routing is another goal of the paper.
The concept of protection routing as just defined bears
similarities with a number of related concepts, and we expand
on this in Section II. The paper nevertheless makes a number
of novel contributions and in particular:
1) It offers new insight into network topological properties
that ensure the feasibility of protection routing;
2) It establishes that computing a protection routing is an
NP-hard problem;
3) It develops a heuristic for computing a routing that
reconciles the often conflicting goals of protectability and
performance;
4) It demonstrates the heuristic’s ability to realize an effective trade-off between protectability and performance
across a range of network topologies, and for several
variations of the notion of protectability (see Section III-A
for details).
In addition, although the work is primarily motivated by its
application to centralized routing systems, the concept of
protection routing and the paper’s analysis also apply to a
distributed setting. However, computing a protection routing
in a distributed manner while avoiding loops requires not
only that all routers have full knowledge of network topology
(i.e., as in link state protocols), but also that they rely on a
common and consistent algorithm for computing (standard and
protection) routes. This is challenging with the randomized
heuristics often required by the intractable nature of many
routing problems (all randomization steps need to be identical).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews related works and contrasts the approach and findings
of the paper against them. Section III introduces protectability
more formally and defines several possible variants. Section IV
presents an analytical investigation of protection routing, while
Section V leverages insight from this analysis to develop a
1 It is easy to construct network graphs for which no matter what routing
is chosen, one or more nodes have no alternate next-hop.
2 Forwarding reverts to the primary next-hop when the failure is fixed or an
updated forwarding state is received.

computationally efficient heuristic. The heuristic favors protectability, while seeking to minimize its impact on performance. This trade-off is further investigated in Section VI,
which develops a modified heuristic that relaxes protectability
in exchange for improved performance. Section VII evaluates
the efficacy of the heuristics in several different scenarios
and for different definitions of protectability. Section VIII
summarizes the paper’s findings.
II. R ELATED W ORKS
This paper considers a centralized routing system similar to
that proposed in [7], [9], [27]. In those works, the primary
motivation for centralizing path computation was manageability. In [19], an efficient message-dissemination solution
was proposed to minimize signaling overhead and avoid the
formation of transient loops in such an environment. This
paper builds on these earlier works by assuming a centralized
routing solution, but differs in its focus. Its aim is to overcome
problems associated with the potential for increased latency
after failures, because of the system’s reliance on a central
server responsible for coordinating updates to the forwarding
states of FEs. Our motivations and general approach for
handling this issue are similar in principle to those behind
many of the IP fast re-routing (IPFRR) schemes that have been
proposed (see [25] for a generic introduction to IPFRR and its
goals). We expand below on specific differences between our
solution and individual IPFRR mechanisms, but an important
contributor to those differences comes from our ability to exploit the flexibility afforded by centralized path computations
to produce routing solutions that are difficult, if not impossible,
to realize in the traditional, distributed environment assumed
by most IPFRR solutions.
IPFRR’s main goal is to ensure fast (sub-50ms) convergence
of intra-domain routing protocols, as soon as failures have
been detected. Current proposals fall in either one of two
categories: those that can operate with an unmodified IP
forwarding plane; and those that involve the use of a different
(usually more complex) forwarding paradigm. The former
category is the more relevant to this paper, which also seeks to
offer protection to failure while preserving the simplicity and
scalability of IP forwarding. In particular, one of our goals is
to maximize the fast re-routing “coverage” achievable in any
network by taking advantage of the flexibility of centralized
routing in computing paths and controlling local forwarding
decisions at each FE.
Examples of IPFRR mechanisms belonging to the first category include loop-free alternate (LFA) [1], O2 [24], [22], [21],
DIV-R [20] and MARA [18]. The LFA proposal of [1] is aimed
primarily at IP networks that run distributed, shortest-pathbased routing algorithms. Furthermore, it relies on a criterion
for ensuring loop freedom when selecting next-hop alternates
(backups) (see [1, Inequality 1]) similar to the invariant of [20].
As alluded to earlier, imposing such a requirement prevents
neighboring nodes from backing each other up (the criterion
enforces an ordering among nodes, so that only one is eligible
as a backup for the other). Both factors limit the coverage that
the scheme is able to provide. This limitation is not present
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in O2 [24], which is not restricted to using shortest paths and
that introduces the concept of “joker” links specifically for the
purpose of allowing mutual backups. These similarities make
the O2 body of work [24], [22], [21] the most relevant to this
paper, and it is, therefore, important to articulate differences
in both scope and contributions.
O2 shares with this paper its applicability to (or more
precisely, need for) a centralized routing system, and the
goal of maximizing the number of nodes that are protected
against any single link or node failure. In O2, this is realized
by ensuring that every node has an “out-degree” (number of
next-hops) of two - hence the name O2 - with one of them
available as a backup in case of failures. This is similar to
our goal as stated in Section I, with the difference that we
do not seek to impose a limit of two on the out-degree, and
will often allow more, especially when trying to reconcile the
need for load-balancing with protectability. As a matter of fact,
exploring the trade-off that exists between protectability and
performance is an important difference between our work and
O2. This difference is further reflected in the path computation
algorithm we propose to jointly optimize protectability and
performance. We demonstrate in Section VII the benefits of
our algorithm in terms of both performance and protectability,
when compared to O2 algorithms [21]. Another difference
between our work and the O2 contributions is our focus on
identifying specific conditions for the feasibility of a protection
routing, and conversely the complexity of finding one when it
exists. In particular, we formally establish in Section IV that
the problem of computing a protection routing is NP-hard,
and provide several characterizations of network topology that
affect the feasibility of protection routing.
The DIV-R algorithm of [20] and the several MARA
algorithms of [18] have similar goals as O2 and this paper,
but differ in their approaches. DIV-R proposes a distributed
algorithm to maximize a metric that reflects the number
of next-hops available to each node. This may be effective
against link failures, but as shown in Section VII, less so
when considering node failures. The MARA algorithms consider several path computation problems aimed at improving
minimum connectivity and fully utilizing all available links;
hence affording greater resilience to failures (MARA’s all-toone maximum connectivity problem is the most relevant, and
similar in spirit to DIV-R). As with DIV-R, protection against
node failures is not explicitly taken into account and neither
is the trade-off between performance and protectability.
The second category of IPFRR works includes [28], [10],
[5], [26], [16], [14], which seek to deliver protectability
irrespective of network topological limitations at the cost
of possible changes to packet forwarding. In contrast, we
want to avoid adding complexity to the data plane. Interfacespecific forwarding tables that handle packet re-routing after
failures while preventing loops are considered in [28]. Multiple
“topologies” are used in [10], [5]; each covering different
failures, with routers switching from one to another upon
detecting a given failure and marking packets according to the
topology to be used. In [26], protection is achieved by using
tunnels to detour packets around failures; hence requiring
packet encapsulation and decapsulation. [16] investigates the

combination of LFA and tunneling to handle different failure
scenarios. Finally, [14] proposes carrying root-cause failure
information in packets to allow routers to diagnose problems
and select alternate paths.
III. M ODEL AND P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
We model the network as a directed graph G = (V, E),
with V the node set, E the link set, and |V | = n. A directed
link from node i to node j is denoted by (i, j). NG (i) =
{j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} is the neighbor set of node i in G. As
discussed in Section I, we assume that information such as
network topology and link bandwidth is available to a central
server for the purpose of path computation. We further assume
that packet forwarding is destination-based without reliance
on packet marking or encapsulation even in the presence of
failures, i.e., the standard IP forwarding paradigm.
For a destination3 d ∈ V , let Rd = (V, Ed ) be a routing
for traffic destined to d, where Ed ⊆ E. Rd is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) rooted at d and defines a destinationbased routing. In Rd , every node i ∈ V \ {d} has at least one
outgoing link. A node j is called a primary next-hop (PNH)
of node i if (i, j) ∈ Ed , and the link (i, j) is called a primary
link of node i. If a node has multiple PNHs, traffic is split
evenly across them. One advantage of centralized routing is
that Rd ’s can be computed independently of each other. In
contrast, a standard IGP such as OSPF computes routings that
are coupled by a common set of link weights. Thus, without
loss of generality, we focus on a single destination d.
When computing Rd , the goal is to maintain uninterrupted
packet forwarding in the presence of any single “component”
(link or node) failure, except for d itself. As discussed in
Section I, this is vital in a centralized routing system to avoid
extended forwarding interruptions after failures. Note that a
two-node connected network is implicitly assumed, so that
paths to d still exist after a failure4 . Protection routing seeks
to find them. Handling more severe failures may be feasible at
the cost of additional complexity and a network connectivity
high enough to avoid partitions.
Definition III.1 After a single component failure f, the resulting network and routing for destination d are denoted by Gf
and Rdf , respectively. Gf and Rdf are constructed by removing
the failed component (node and/or link(s)) associated with f
from G and Rd respectively.
Definition III.2 Node i is said to be upstream of node j in a
routing Rd if there exists a path from node i to node j in Rd .
Conversely, node j is then downstream of node i.
Definition III.3 In a routing Rd , node i 6= d is said to be
protected (with respect to d), if after any single component
failure f that affects node i’s PNH(s), there exists a node k ∈
NGf (i) such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1) Node k is not upstream of node i in Rdf .
2) Node k and all its downstream nodes (except d) have at
least one PNH in Rdf .
3 For simplicity, we associate each node with a single destination, while in
practice this would encompass all prefixes for which a node is the egress.
4 As discussed in [19], this also ensures that the central server eventually
learns about the failure, and can compute and download new forwarding states
to FEs without creating routing loops.
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Node k is called a secondary next-hop (SNH) of node i for f
and d. By convention, destination d is always protected.
Definition III.3 is inspired by LFA but does not mandate the
use of shortest paths, nor does it require [1, Inequality 1] to
prevent loops. The two conditions of Definition III.3 imply that
when the PNH of node i fails and packets are rerouted to node
k: (i) routing loops never form [condition (1)]; and (ii) packets
are delivered to d through node k and its downstream nodes
in Rdf [condition (2)]. Examples illustrating the feasibility or
infeasibility of these conditions are provided in Section III-B.
A. Protection routing
Definition III.3 formalizes the notion of protectability for
an individual node, against single failures that locally (at that
node) affect forwarding decisions towards a given destination.
This basic concept can be extended in a number of ways.
It can be extended to all nodes for a given destination, and
more generally to all nodes and all destinations. Specifically,
we define the concepts of protection routing and protectable
graphs as follows:
Definition III.4 Rd is said to be a protection routing if every
node i ∈ V is protected in Rd .
Definition III.5 A graph G = (V, E) is said to be protectable
if a protection routing exists ∀ d ∈ V .
By Definition III.4, if Rd is a protection routing, packet
forwarding (and delivery) can proceed uninterrupted from any
node in the network to d in the presence of any single component failure (besides that of d itself). Similarly, if a graph
is protectable according to Definition III.5, this guarantee
extends to all nodes and all destinations. However, as we shall
see in Section IV, such strong guarantees need not always be
feasible and only a subset of nodes and/or destinations may
be protectable. In such cases and given the traditional duplex
nature of communications, it is useful to introduce the concept
of duplex protection routing as follows:
Definition III.6 A duplex protection routing with respect to
destination d exists if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) There exists a protection routing Rd .
2) For every node i ∈ V \ {d}, there exists a routing Ri such
that node d and all its downstream nodes toward i are
protected.
Definition III.6 states that if a duplex protection routing exists for d, then even in the presence of a single failure, packets
originating from any node will be delivered to d [condition
(1)] and conversely responses from d will be able to reach
any node [condition (2)]. Note that the requirement of duplex
protection is stronger than that of (simple) protection routing
specified in Definition III.4, i.e., it requires the existence of
a protection routing for a given destination d, as well as
“partial” protection routings for all nodes (the branch from
d back to each individual node now serving as the destination). This more stringent requirement limits the number of
routing solutions capable of realizing it. As we shall see in
Section VII-C, this can affect the trade-off between protection
and performance. However, it should be noted that when a
graph is protectable according to Definitions III.5, protection
routing and duplex protection routing are equivalent. In other
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Fig. 1. Different routing choices (denoted by arrows) for destination d in a
sample network. Shadowed nodes are unprotected.

words, in a protectable graph all nodes are protected and
duplex protected for all destinations, and vice-versa.
In general, the main challenges are in identifying when
such routings are feasible, and in computing them, or when
not feasible, computing routings that maximize protectability
(duplex or not). In particular, when a protectable graph is
not feasible, the goal will be finding routings that for each
destination maximize the number of (duplex) protected nodes5 .
We explore these computational challenges in Section IV, and
in Sections V and VI we develop a heuristic to compute
routings that satisfy different protectability and performance
goals. Before proceeding with these investigations, we provide
some illustrative examples that help anchor the discussion.
B. Discussion
Fig. 1 illustrates on a simple network topology how different
routing choices affect protectability for a destination d. The
routing of Fig. 1(a) does not protect nodes 1, 2, 3 and 6
under Definition III.3. For example, although node 1 has two
PNHs, it is not protected against a failure of node 2. This
is because its other PNH, node 4, is itself upstream of the
failed node 2 (this violates condition (2) of Definition III.3).
Similarly, node 6 is not protected against a failure of link
(6, d), as its two neighbors, nodes 4 and 5, are both upstream
of itself (this violates condition (1) of Definition III.3). The
routing of Fig. 1(b) succeeds in protecting node 6 against the
failure of link (6, d), because node 5 is now a valid SNH.
However, according to condition (2) of Definition III.3, node
1 is still not protected against a failure of node 2, as even
if node 4 now has a PNH (i.e., node 6) that does not rely on
node 2, it will still forward some packets destined to d towards
node 3 (node 4 is unaware of the failure of node 2 and loadbalances across its two PNHs) that remains unprotected. This
last issue is resolved in Fig. 1(c), where all nodes are now
protected. Note that to ensure protectability, more links are left
unused during normal operations, so that they are available for
mutual backups after failures. This illustrates the tension that
exists between performance and protectability, and is one of
the issues we explore further in Sections VI and VII.
5 Definition III.6 can be readily generalized to cases where duplex protectability is available for only a subset of nodes, i.e., an individual node i
is duplex protected for a given destination d, if all its downstream neighbors
towards d are protected, and if d and all its downstream neighbors towards i
are protected.
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Fig. 1(d) illustrates a subtle issue that arises from the choice
of conditions in Definition III.3, and in particular condition (2)
that calls for backup paths to only use PNHs. Fig. 1(d) gives
an example of a routing for which node 2 is not protected
(against a failure of node 5) according to Definition III.3, but
that still ensures delivery of packets to d after a failure of
node 5. This is because, when node 5 fails, node 2 forwards
packets to its SNH, node 3, which passes them to its PNH,
node 4. Node 4’s PNH, however, was also node 5, so that
node 4 knows that it must forward packets to its own SNH,
node 6, which finds itself in a similar situation and forwards
packets to its own SNH, namely, d. This ensures delivery of
packets to d, but violates condition (2) of Definition III.3.
The intuitive “fix” of relaxing condition (2) to allow packet
forwarding using both PNH and SNH does unfortunately not
work, as such a relaxation can introduce loops. In general,
instances where backup paths such those of Fig. 1(d) improve
protectability appear to be rare. Furthermore, systematically
exploring them can add significant computational complexity,
as all possible combinations of PNHs and SNHs need to be
considered. Section V-D introduces a compromise based on an
algorithm that iterates over possible SNH assignments once a
choice of PNHs has been finalized, and allows the discovery
of paths such as those of Fig. 1(d).
IV. A NALYSIS
The goal of this section is to explore topological properties
that are sufficient to ensure protectability, i.e., determine
if a graph is protectable, and characterize the algorithmic
complexity of computing routings that realize it. We model
a network as an undirected graph G = (V, E), so that finding
a protection routing is equivalent to identifying an orientation
for a subset of links such that every node is protected, i.e., an
ordering among nodes that makes re-routing possible without
creating loops. Graph terminology not defined in the paper can
be found in [6]. All proofs are provided in appendices at the
end of the paper, except for the proof of Theorem IV.5 that is
only partially provided and available in full in [12].
In the next two sub-sections, we explore sufficient conditions for a graph to be protectable. Because, as mentioned
earlier, protection routing and duplex protection routing are
equivalent when a graph is protectable, we do not distinguish
between them in those two sections. The third sub-section is
devoted to the topic of computational complexity for which
computing a protection routing and a duplex protection routing
are considered separately.
A. Does a simple sufficient condition exist?
A necessary condition for a graph to be protectable is for
every node to have two neighbors. Thus, it is natural to ask
if the node degree of a graph can be used to characterize
protectability. A simple sufficient condition for a graph to be
protectable is as follows.
Theorem IV.1 Every graph with n ≥ 5 nodes and minimum
degree at least dn/2e is protectable.
Theorem IV.1 cannot be improved in that we cannot replace
the bound of dn/2e with bn/2c , as there exists a 1-node-

connected graph6 with minimum degree bn/2c , which is
obviously not protectable.
Theorem IV.1 implies that in the absence of any global
graph property, a high minimum degree is needed to guarantee
protectability. A natural next step is to explore if introducing
global graph properties such as link- and node-connectedness
can yield less stringent sufficient conditions for protectability.
Intuitively, k-link-connectedness, for k large enough, would
seem sufficient to ensure protectability. Surprisingly, this is
not true in general, no matter how large k is. The result is
summarized as follows.
Theorem IV.2 For any given k ∈ Z+ , there exists a k-linkconnected graph that is unprotectable.
Theorem IV.2 establishes that even with arbitrarily many
link-disjoint paths, a protection routing is not guaranteed to
exist. A similar question can be asked using the stronger
condition of node-connectedness. In this setting, we only have
the weaker result of Theorem IV.3 and a conjecture as follows.
Theorem IV.3 For k = 2, 3, there exists a k-node-connected
graph that is unprotectable.
Conjecture IV.1 For any given k ≥ 4, there exists a k-nodeconnected graph that is unprotectable.
The reason why the relatively strong properties of Theorems IV.2 and IV.3 fail to ensure protectability, is because
destination-based routing induces an ordering among nodes;
something that is not present when, for example, computing
node-disjoint paths. Hence, even if each node individually has
several disjoint paths to a destination, this need not hold when
coupling them through a common destination-based routing.
B. On random graphs
The previous results showed that even graphs with very
rich connectivity, e.g., large degree or connectedness, were
not guaranteed to be protectable. However, the proofs of
these results involved graphs with very specific structure. A
natural question is whether such graphs are the norm or the
exception. To explore this question, we rely on a family of
graphs with little or no special structure, i.e., random graphs,
and investigate what can be said about their protectability. We
use Erdös-Rényi random graphs G(n, p), where n denotes the
number of nodes and p is the link probability (e.g., see [4,
Chapter 2]), and analyze under what conditions such graphs
are protectable as n becomes large. This calls for finding
routings such that for each destination all nodes have a suitable
SNH to reroute traffic after failures. The random and relatively
homogeneous structure of random graphs makes it possible to
establish the following result.
Theorem IV.4 Let G ∈ G(n, p) and p = (4 + ε) log n/n
where ε > 0 is any constant and log is the natural logarithm.
Then asymptotically almost surely G is protectable.
Theorem IV.4 implies that a mean degree that grows like
O (log n) is sufficient to ensure that a random graph is
protectable with probability tending to 1 as n → ∞. In other
words, in the absence of structure explicitly aimed at defeating
it, the level of connectivity required to ensure protectability
6 If n is odd, such a graph can be constructed by taking the union of two
copies of complete graph K dn/2e connected at one node.
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is significantly lower than that required by Theorem IV.1.
Although random graphs are not representative of all network
topologies, this provides some hope that protectability is feasible in many practical networks with reasonable connectivity.
The next section is devoted to assessing how difficult the task
of computing such protection routings is.
C. NP-completeness of protection routing problems
This section analyzes the algorithmic complexity of computing protection and duplex protection routings for a given
destination d. Note that while when a graph is protectable, protection routing and duplex protection routing are equivalent,
simply comparing Definitions III.4 and III.6 clearly indicates
that this is not so when focusing on a single destination d.
As a result, both need to be investigated individually. For that
purpose, we formulate the PR problem and the DPR problem
as follows.
PR problem
• Instance: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a
destination node d ∈ V .
• Question: Does a protection routing destined to d exist?
DPR problem
• Instance: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a
destination node d ∈ V .
• Question: Does a duplex protection routing with respect
to d exist?
Theorem IV.5 The PR and the DPR problems are NPcomplete.
Theorem IV.5 indicates that in an arbitrary graph there is
no known polynomial-time algorithm to solve the PR and
the DPR problems unless P=NP. The proof is based on a
reduction from the 3SAT problem, and the PR-specific version
of the proof is in Appendix D while its DPR complement can
be found in [12]. Given the computational complexity of the
PR and DPR problems, heuristics are therefore required to
compute protection routings.
V. H EURISTIC D ESIGN
Our goal is to compute n routings (one for each destination)
to maximize protectability while realizing good network performance (e.g., congestion) in normal (failure-free) situations.
Computing a protection routing (PR) or duplex protection
routing (DPR) for a destination is NP-hard because the decision versions of the problems are NP-complete. Because
all n routings contribute to link loads, adding the dimension
of performance introduces a coupling that only makes the
problem harder. Practical solutions must, therefore, rely on
heuristics. This section describes a heuristic for computing
solutions to the PR and DPR problems introduced in the
previous sections. Solutions that satisfy different definitions
of protectability could also be computed by the heuristic,
provided that their requirements can be mapped to an “appropriate” cost function (see below for additional details on
the characteristics of appropriate cost functions).
A. Heuristic outline
The heuristic seeks to compute routings Rd , ∀ d ∈ V,
which achieve protectability while minimizing the resulting

performance degradations in the absence of failures. In order
to realize this goal while keeping computational complexity
low, the heuristic is structured in two distinct phases.
Phase 1 proceeds to compute protection routings independently for each destination d. Its goal is to minimize a
cost function Ωd that measures “unprotectability” for each
individual destination. Ωd can in turn be chosen to reflect
different protectability targets. For example, if a PR solution is
needed, Ωd can be set to measure the number of unprotected
nodes, or a “weighted” version in case some nodes are deemed
more important than others. If instead a DPR solution is
the target, Ωd can be set to measure the number of nodes
that are either unprotected themselves or with at least one
unprotected node in their downstream path to the destination7 .
More generally, pretty much any function can be used for Ωd
based on the specific protectability goals being targeted.
Phase 2 complements Phase 1 by jointly considering the
routings it produced, i.e., how together they affect network
performance, and attempts to modify them to optimize performance without hurting protectability. Performance is measured
through a cost function Φ, which for example can reflect
network congestion.
For illustration purposes, we select the
P
function Φ = l∈E Φl of [8], where Φl denotes the congestion cost of link l as a function of its load. Other expressions
for Φ can be readily used. Pseudocode specifications of all the
heuristics can be found in [12].
B. Phase 1 - Greedy search
Phase 1 uses a greedy search with a cost function Fd , d ∈ V ,
that focuses on Ωd but remains congestion aware. Congestion
is not explicitly accounted for in Fd to preserve independent
computations across destinations. It is used to influence the
greedy exploration of the solution space.
Specifically, prior to Phase 1, a standard traffic optimization
routine, e.g., [8], is run to assess the best network congestion
cost Φopt in the absence of protectability considerations. This
provides routings, Rdopt , d ∈ V , that achieve Φopt , as well as a
benchmark against which to compare network congestion costs
under protection routing. Each routing Rdopt can be computed
using a shortest path algorithm with appropriate link weights.
These link weights are used in Phase 1 to compute a deviation
||Rd − Rdopt || between a proposed protection routing
P Rd and
Rdopt . This deviation is measured8 using Γd =
i∈V Γi,d ,
where Γi,d denotes the distance from node i to destination d
under Rd , with distances computed using the link weights of
Rdopt . The smaller Γd , the “closer” Rd is to Rdopt . Thus, Φ
achieved by Rd is also expectedly closer to Φopt . This metric
guides the selection of solutions during Phase 1 as follows.
The cost function Fd is defined as Fd = hΩd , Γd i where
ha1 , b1 i > ha2 , b2 i if and only if a1 > a2 , or a1 = a2 and
b1 > b2 . This gives precedence to protectability, while favoring
solutions with lower congestion costs (as measured through
Γd ) when it does not affect protectability. The optimization
7 This accounts for the fact that when not all nodes are protectable, leaving
a node close to the root (destination) unprotected affects duplex protectability
of a greater number of nodes.
8 Other measures can easily be accommodated.
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carried out in Phase 1 is then of the form:
∀ d ∈ V minimize Fd = hΩd , Γd i .
Rd

(1)

Note that although Γd in Fd accounts for congestion, computations for different destinations are still decoupled. This
is because Γd is computed based on a fixed reference point
(i.e., the link weights that produced Rdopt ). This also avoids
evaluating the cost function Φ for each candidate routing, an
operation that in itself has a significant computational cost.
A “Greedy-search” heuristic is used to minimize Eq. (1).
It was inspired by approximation algorithms for the 3SAT
problem from which the NPC of the PR problem and the
DPR problem is reduced, and operates on routings limited
to trees (i.e., each node except the destination has only one
PNH). There are two motivations for the latter. First, assigning
multiple PNHs to a node may affect the protectability of other
nodes as discussed in Section III-B. Second, the sheer number
of possible combinations involving multiple PNHs makes it
computationally impractical to consider them all. Allowing
multiple PNHs can reduce congestion through better loadbalancing. This aspect is considered separately in Phase 2. 
The heuristic starts with an initial routing Rd = T Rdopt
obtained by extracting a tree from Rdopt (when multiple nexthops are available, one is randomly selected). The main loop
uses local feasibility checks to explore improvements in Fd
when swapping the PNH of node i ∈ V \ {d}. This process
repeats until Fd shows no improvement for all nodes. A
diversification step is then executed, and generates a new
random shortest path tree rooted at d. Unlike the first tree
based on Rdopt , the new tree is generated using random link
weights uniformly selected in [1, 1000]. This ensures that after
exploring the neighborhood of Rdopt , the search restarts at a
different point of the solution space9 . The heuristic stops after
P diversifications without improvement to Fd .
C. Phase 2 - Load-balancing
The routing trees Rd∗ , ∀d ∈ V , of Phase 1 are used as inputs
to Phase 2. Phase 2 seeks to assign multiple PNHs to nodes to
better distribute traffic (load-balance), subject to the constraint
that Ωd , ∀d ∈ V, cannot increase. Its procedure examines
each node i in decreasing order10 of its congestion11 , and
tries to assign it multiple PNHs to better load-balance traffic
and reduce its congestion cost. Note that Phase 2 involves
evaluating Φ for each candidate routing, and this is where the
bulk of its computational cost lies. The heuristic stops when
Φ cannot be further reduced through new PNH assignments.
D. SNH assignment
The first two phases of the heuristic produce a set of routings
that maximize protectability while minimizing congestion cost
by load-balancing across multiple PNHs, as long as it does
9 Other diversification methods were tried, e.g., shuffling a subset of PNHs
in the tree, generating increasingly perturbed versions of Rdopt , etc. The more
diverse starting points of a random diversification consistently resulted in a
better exploration of the solution space.
10 Other orders, e.g., random, fixed, were tried and found to perform worse.
11 Defined by the sum of link costs at the node.

not affect protectability. By definition of protectability, all
protected nodes have at least one SNH they can use in case
of failure to forward packets on an alternate path that delivers
packets to the destination solely through PNH forwarding. As
discussed earlier, the restriction to PNH forwarding imposed
by Definition III.3 precludes backup paths involving multiple
SNHs, which could improve protectability. Allowing such
paths, however, requires some care to avoid loops. Note that
this step is important in practice, as unless packet marking
is used, i.e., to indicate prior SNH forwarding, independent
forwarding decisions across nodes can readily result in multiple SNHs being used in the presence of single failures, e.g.,
the case of Fig. 1(d). In this section, we describe an algorithm
that assigns SNH (when a choice is available) to allow backup
paths involving multiple SNHs, while ensuring the absence of
loops. This is outlined for a given d with details in [12].
Rd = (V, Ed ) denotes the routing for d produced by
Phases 1 and 2, where Ed ⊆ E is the set of primary links.
After failure f , Rdf = (V f , Edf ) denotes the residual routing
after removing the failed component(s). Let Sdf : V → V ∪{∅}
denote the SNH assignment mapping for failure f , with
Sdf (i) ∈ V ∪ {∅} the SNH assigned to node i. An empty
assignment, i.e., Sdf (i) = ∅, implies that there is either no
need to assign an SNH to node i because its PNH is not
affected by f, or no suitable SNH can be found. Our goal
is to explore SNH assignments that maximize protectability
when allowing backup paths that involve multiple
 SNHs.
S
Let Hdf = V f , Edf i∈V,S f (i)6=∅ (i, Sdf (i)) be a routing
d

under failure f . Note that Hdf combines Rdf and Sdf , and hence
permits the use of multiple SNHs. This calls for additional
precautions when assigning SNHs. Specifically, assume that
node k is a candidate SNH for node i after failure f . Node k
can be selected if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(H1) Hdf remains a DAG after the addition of link (i, k); (H2)
Node k and all its downstream nodes (except d) have an outdegree of at least one in Hdf . Condition (H1) ensures that
loops are avoided, while Conditions (H1) and (H2) together
guarantee packets delivery to d. Using these two conditions,
SNHs can be assigned to improve protectability of nodes
affected by failure f and with initially (after Phases 1 and 2)
no feasible SNH, i.e., Sdf (i) = ∅. This continues until no SNH
assignment satisfying conditions (H1) and (H2) is found. Note
that the fact that PNHs remain fixed is in part what keeps
computational complexity manageable.
VI. T RADING P ROTECTABILITY FOR P ERFORMANCE
The cost function Fd gives strict precedence to protectability. A natural question is whether this can be relaxed to tradeoff protectability for performance. Such a trade-off can be
formulated using the following optimization:
minimize Φ
(2)
Rd ,d∈V

subject to
Ωd ≤ (1 + εd ) Ω∗d
Ω∗d

∀d ∈ V

(3)

where
denotes the smallest possible value of Ωd , and
εd ≥ 0 controls how much protectability can be traded-off
for performance.

8

In realizing such a trade-off, computational complexity is
again the main concern. Our proposed solution is based on
two observations: (i) computing Ω∗d , ∀d ∈ V , as required
by Eq. (3), calls for performing Phase 1; and (ii) a large
number of routings are examined during Phase 1. A natural
option is to take advantage of the availability of those routings.
Specifically, we keep all routings examined during Phase 1,
and at the end of Phase 1 we identify those that satisfy
Eq. (3). We then select for each destination d, the routing
that minimizes Γd . Those routings can subsequently be further
improved by invoking Phase 2.
This approach leverages the computational tractability of the
previous heuristic (it has the same computational complexity,
and avoids most expensive computations of the cost function
Φ), and the additional memory it requires to store the routings
examined during Phase 1 is relatively small. Intelligently
discarding routings whenever they fail to satisfy Eq. (3) based
on the current estimate of Ω∗d can further reduce this memory.
VII. E VALUATION
This section offers numerical evidences of the efficacy in
computing protection routings and trading protectability for
performance of the heuristic introduced in Sections V and VI.
The evaluation proceeds in three steps. The first step (Section VII-B) compares the proposed heuristic to earlier works
with a similar goal of protectability. Because those works
relied on a definition of protectability that is essentially that
of the PR problem, the evaluation is carried out in that context
rather than that of the DPR problem. Evaluating the efficacy
of the heuristic for the DPR problem is the focus of the second
step of the evaluation (Section VII-C). Finally, the third step
(Section VII-D) evaluates the heuristic’s ability to compute
solutions that realize a desired trade-off between protectability
and performance. Before presenting the results, we review the
environment in which the evaluation is conducted.
A. Evaluation settings
1) Network topologies: A range of real and synthesized
topologies are used to evaluate the heuristic as key metrics of
network structure (e.g., node degree, network size, etc.) vary.
• RN: Random topology of given average node degree.
• PL: Power-law topology based on the preferential attachment model [2].
• AS: Real topologies from the Rocketfuel project [23] and
labeled by their AS numbers12 .
Link capacities are all set equal to unity with traffic demand
(see below) used to generate heterogeneous load levels.
2) Traffic matrix: The traffic matrix M = [r (s, t)]|V |×|V |
is generated using a gravity model [11], [15], [3], [17] as
follows: Traffic volume from node s to node t is defined
at
as r (s, t) = bs P e
where bs is the total traffic
ai
i∈V \{s} e
originating at node s, and is uniformly distributed in [10, 50],
[80, 130] and [150, 200] with probabilities 0.6, 0.35 and 0.05
respectively, at is the “mass” of node
P t which is proportional
to the number of links it has and i∈V ai = 1. The larger a
12 Nodes

isolated from the giant component are removed.

node’s mass, the more traffic it attracts. Using bs , the model
generates three different load levels. Finally, M is scaled to
produce a reasonable link utilization in the network.
3) Heuristic setting: The heuristic involves only one parameter, P, used as the stopping criterion of Phase 1. We set
P = 10, so that Phase 1 is stopped if there is no improvement
after 10 diversification rounds. This value balances solution
quality and computational time in our experiments.
4) Comparison: We use the proposed two-phase heuristic
and the SNH assignment algorithm to compute protection
routing solutions, and the results are denoted by PR or DPR.
The solutions produced by the heuristic are then compared to
the following previous approaches:
• SP: Routings computed by the OSPF optimization in [8].
• DIVR: Routings computed by DIV-R from [20].
13
• O2: Routings computed by the pattern-based algorithm
of [21].
We believe this provides a reasonable coverage of both
the heuristic’s performance across different networks, and its
comparison to other alternatives. SP is commonly used for
intra-domain routing in large ISP’s, e.g., [17], and focuses
solely on performance. DIVR, like [18], seeks to maximize
the number of PNHs at each node but without considering the
use of SNHs after failures. O2 optimizes for protectability, but
is oblivious to performance.
B. On the efficacy of computing protection routing solutions
This section investigates the efficacy of the heuristic in computing protection routing solutions by comparing it to earlier
alternatives with similar goals. To facilitate this comparison,
we set Ωd in the heuristic to be the number of unprotected
nodes for destination d, which corresponds to the primary
metric of interest in earlier approaches. Evaluations are carried
out on both synthesized and real topologies (Figs. 2 and 3),
with results first reported for synthesized topologies with mean
degrees varying from three to five. The x-axis of Figs. 2 and 3
shows destination IDs sorted in ascending order of the number
of protected nodes under SP, while the y-axis reports the
number of protected nodes for each destination. The results
illustrate that PR significantly improves protectability when
compared to other solutions. Moreover, the results show that
the gap is still present even in richly connected topologies for
which, as indicated by Theorems IV.1 and IV.4, a protection
routing is more likely to exist. Hence, even in those topologies,
protection routings remain difficult to find unless an efficient
heuristic is used.
It should be noted that the relatively poor performance of
DIVR can, as mentioned earlier, be partly attributed to its focus
on link failures that makes it more susceptible to node failures.
Another finding from the figure is that a mean degree of 4
(i.e., 70 nodes and 140 links) appears sufficient to realize near
100% protectability with PR. This indicates that protectability
should be feasible in practice under reasonable connectivity.
The results of another set of evaluations carried out on real
ISP topologies are shown in Fig. 3, where the mean degrees
13 This algorithm is chosen among several O2 heuristics, because, as
reported in [21], it provides better protectability.
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TABLE I
N ETWORK PERFORMANCE ACROSS TOPOLOGIES .

Topology [# nodes, # links]
Average link load (PR)
Average link load (SP)
Average link load (DIVR)
Average link load (O2)
Maximum link load (PR)
Maximum link load (SP)
Maximum link load (DIVR)
Maximum link load (O2)
Increase in Φ under PR (%)
Increase in Φ under DIVR (%)
Increase in Φ under O2 (%)

RN [70,105]
0.20
0.18
0.22
0.18
0.86
0.66
0.90
1.12
48.06
55.05
495

RN [70,140]
0.31
0.28
0.44
0.32
0.66
0.66
1.36
1.18
11.79
4690
978

RN [70,175]
0.22
0.20
0.36
0.25
0.55
0.55
1.23
1.29
0.12
3284
1358

of AS 1221, AS 1755 and AS 3967 are 2.90, 3.70 and 3.72,
respectively. The figure offers similar conclusions, namely, PR
is effective in computing protection routings, and its advantage
over other solutions remains even in richly connected ASes
such as AS 3967.
Table I displays several performance metrics across topologies, where comparisons with SP reflect the cost of protectability. In the case of Φ, increases relative to SP are reported for
PR, DIVR and O2, where a positive (negative) value denotes
degradation (improvement). Under PR, network performance
typically degrades slightly. This is expected because PR leaves
some links unused under normal conditions to ensure they are

PL [70,105]
0.24
0.21
0.25
0.22
0.66
0.67
1.00
1.33
15.12
91.86
4455

PL [70,140]
0.21
0.19
0.28
0.23
0.53
0.62
1.56
1.53
10.60
13203
11112

PL [70,175]
0.29
0.28
0.43
0.35
0.74
0.84
2.92
2.60
-3.98
56690
44917

AS 1221
0.11
0.10
0.12
0.11
0.93
0.93
1.13
1.30
3.73
492
3792

AS 1755
0.26
0.23
0.31
0.24
0.98
0.90
1.57
1.23
19.72
3619
1246

AS 3967
0.15
0.13
0.18
0.14
0.91
0.89
1.17
1.18
32.51
889
1667

available for protection after failures. This cost is, however,
small, especially in comparison to that incurred by DIVR
and O2, which often result in very high levels of congestion.
This is in part because both are oblivious to performance
when computing routings, and demonstrates that the heuristic
is successful at reconciling performance and protectability.
For completeness, we also report the increase in average
path length (hop count) over SP across all experiments.
The increases are 10.81%, 42.75%, and 14.10% under PR,
DIVR, and O2, respectively. This illustrates that under PR,
protectability has minimal impact on path length. Details about
average path length in each experiment can be found in [12].
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TABLE II
T RADE - OFF BETWEEN PROTECTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE .
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15.67
16.58
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C. Realizing duplex protection routing
In this section, we extend the investigation to the computation of routing solutions that offer duplex protection. As
mentioned earlier, most communications are duplex in nature,
so that duplex protection is a natural metric. Furthermore,
duplex protectability is important for locations such as data
centers, server farms, and Internet gateways which attract a
high volume of traffic and require high availability to other
nodes in the network.
In order to compute a routing that offers duplex protectability to destination d, we set Ωd in the heuristic to measure
the number of nodes that are either unprotected or have at
least one unprotected node in their downstream paths towards
d. Note that this choice, as opposed to simply the number
of unprotected nodes used in the previous section, gives
preference to routings where unprotected nodes are towards
the “leaves” of the routing DAG rooted at d. This captures a
key aspect of duplex protectability, namely, the notion of endto-end connectivity as opposed to only local protectability.
As before, the performance of the heuristic is compared to
that of several other alternatives. For illustration purposes, we
report the results for a random topology (70 nodes and 140
links) and AS 3967 in Fig. 4. The x-axis is again destination
IDs sorted in ascending order of the corresponding number of
nodes with duplex protectability under SP. Results obtained on
other topologies were consistent with those of Fig. 4, which
again illustrates the efficacy of the heuristic. As discussed in
Section III-A, because of the more stringent requirement that
duplex protectability imposes, the number of routing solutions
that satisfy it is more limited. The impact this has is clear
from comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 3(c). Although
the heuristic still vastly outperforms other approaches, the
number of nodes for which duplex protectability can be
guaranteed is lower than that for which (simple) protectability
can be ensured. In particular, Fig. 4 identifies a handful of
nodes (destinations) for which the heuristic performs poorly.
These correspond to node locations for which ensuring duplex
connectivity in the presence of (single) failures is essentially
impossible. This has implications for service location, i.e., it
would be unwise to locate a data center there or even to make
one of these nodes a major gateway to the Internet, and the
output of the heuristic offers guidelines for such choices.
Another dimension in which the more stringent requirements of duplex protectability manifest themselves is in their
impact on routing performance. Specifically, the smaller number of routings that satisfy duplex protectability means that

optimizing for protection may force the choice of a poor
performing routing. This is again illustrated by comparing the
performance of (duplex) protection routing solutions of Fig. 4
with their counterparts of Section VII-B that were computed
under the lesser requirements of (simple) protection routing.
When compared to the performance of SP, the solutions of
Fig. 4 delivered increases of 20.06% and 48.82% in the
network cost Φ. This is to be compared to increases of
only 11.79% and 32.51% for the solutions of Section VII-B.
Nevertheless, we see that the heuristic still achieves much
better performance than either DIVR or O2 (see Table I) that
both target the lesser requirements of (simple) protectability.
In the next section, we explore further the heuristic’s ability
to sacrifice some protectability to improve performance.
D. Trading protectability for performance
The previous section demonstrated that duplex protectability
has a cost when it comes to network performance. Following
the discussion of Section VI, we evaluate the heuristic’s
ability to produce solutions that trade some degradation in
(duplex) protectability to improve performance. For simplicity,
we assume that in Eq. (3), εd = ε, ∀d ∈ V .
Table II illustrates the trade-off between duplex protectability and performance for two topologies. The table uses results
for ε = 0 (i.e., no trade-off) as a benchmark for the decrease14
in Φ realized by an increase in the number of non-duplexprotected nodes (denoted by “NDup” in the table) allowed by
different values of ε’s and averaged over all destinations.
The main observation from the results of Table II is that
the proposed heuristic successfully trades-off a lower level
of protectability for better performance. In addition, it is
generally the case that the maximum gains are obtained “early
on,” i.e., a slight initial decrease in protectability provides the
biggest relative gains in performance. This demonstrates that
the heuristic can provide network operators with a tunable solution for selecting a routing that provides the desired balance
between protectability and performance. Furthermore, since
the solution has essentially the same computational complexity
as the base heuristic, it can be readily used in practice. Similar
conclusions hold when seeking the same trade-off for (simple)
protection routing. Results for this setting can be found in [13].
E. Computational complexity
Finally, to support our claim of computational efficiency, we
report computational times under duplex protection routing for
several large topologies. For the RN [70,175], PL [70,175],
14 The

relative decrease in Φ is at most 100%, which corresponds to Φ = 0.
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and AS 1221 topologies, run times were 1.99 hours, 1.64
hours, and 1.82 hours, respectively. None of the experiments
required more than 300MB of memory. These results are
obtained with a Pentium Xeon 2.66 GHz machine. Note
that the computational times are realized without trying to
explicitly take advantage of the inherent parallelism of the
computations (the n routings of Phase 1 are independent and
can be computed in parallel).
VIII. C ONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the feasibility of protection routing in a centralized routing system, which displays heightened
sensitivity to failures due to latency in responses from the
central server. The paper identified topological properties that
affect the feasibility of protection routing and established that
computing protection routings is NP-hard. It developed an
efficient heuristic to compute routings that not only optimize
protectability, but also minimize its performance cost. The
heuristic was shown to outperform earlier proposals, and its
efficacy demonstrated for a range of topologies.
There are many directions in which this work can be extended. The first is to demonstrate the feasibility of protectability in a centralized routing system through an implementation.
Another direction is to more systematically investigate the
aspect of network design for protectability. Yet another area
is to develop update mechanisms at the central server that are
aware of which nodes have protection and which do not, and
select update orderings based on this information and the need
to avoid loops when updating forwarding states.
R EFERENCES
[1] A. Atlas and A. Zinin, “Basic specification for IP fast reroute: Loop-free
alternates,” IETF RFC 5286, September 2008.
[2] A.-L. Barabási and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random networks,” Science, vol. 286, no. 5439, pp. 509–512, October 1999.
[3] S. Bhattacharyya, N. Taft, J. Jetcheva, and C. Diot, “POP-level and
access-link-level traffic dynamics in a Tier-1 POP,” in Proc. ACM IMW,
2001.
[4] B. Bollobas, Random Graphs, 2nd ed. Cambridge U. Press, 2001.
[5] T. Cicic, A. Hansen, A. Kvalbein, M. Hartmann, R. Martin, M. Menth,
S. Gjessing, and O. Lysne, “Relaxed multiple routing configurations: IP
fast reroute for single and correlated failures,” IEEE Transactions on
Network and Service Management, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–14, March 2009.
[6] R. Diestel, Graph Theory, 3rd ed. Springer, 2005.
[7] N. Feamster, H. Balakrishnan, J. Rexford, A. Shaikh, and J. van der
Merwe, “The case for separating routing from routers,” in Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM FDNA workshop, 2004.
[8] B. Fortz and M. Thorup, “Internet traffic engineering by optimizing
OSPF weights,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2000.
[9] A. Greenberg, G. Hjalmtysson, D. A. Maltz, A. Myers, J. Rexford,
G. Xie, H. Yan, J. Zhan, and H. Zhang, “A clean slate 4D approach
to network control and management,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, vol. 35, no. 5, October 2005.
[10] A. Kvalbein, A. F. Hansen, T. Cicic, S. Gjessing, and O. Lysne, “Fast IP
network recovery using multiple routing configurations,” in Proc. IEEE
INFOCOM, 2006.
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[12] K.-W. Kwong, L. Gao, R. Guérin, and Z.-L. Zhang, “On the feasibility
and efficacy of protection routing in IP networks,” University of Pennsylvania, Tech. Rep., July 2009.
[13] ——, “On the feasibility and efficacy of protection routing in IP
networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2010.

[14] K. Lakshminarayanan, M. Caesar, M. Rangan, T. Anderson, S. Shenker,
and I. Stoica, “Achieving convergence-free routing using failure-carrying
packets,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, 2007.
[15] A. Medina, N. Taft, K. Salamatian, S. Bhattacharyya, and C. Diot,
“Traffic matrix estimation: Existing techniques and new directions,” in
Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, 2002.
[16] M. Menth, M. Hartmann, R. Martin, T. Cicic, and A. Kvalbein, “Loopfree alternates and not-via addresses: A proper combination for IP fast
reroute?” Computer Networks, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1300–1315, 2010.
[17] A. Nucci, S. Bhattacharyya, N. Taft, and C. Diot, “IGP link weight
assignment for operational Tier-1 backbones,” IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 789–802, August 2007.
[18] Y. Ohara, S. Imahori, and R. V. Meter, “MARA: Maximum alternative
routing algorithm,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2009.
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A PPENDIX A
P ROOF OF T HEOREM IV.1
Let n ≥ 5 be the number of nodes in a graph. First consider
how to build a protection routing for a destination d. Since the
graph has minimum degree at least dn/2e, it has a Hamilton
cycle [6, Theorem 10.1.1, p. 276]. For a given Hamilton cycle,
the nodes are labeled clockwise, using {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, starting from the node besides destination d. Note that destination
d must have at least dn/2e − 2 link(s) connected to some
nodes other than nodes 1 and n − 1. Suppose that one of
the links from destination d lands on node j ∈ [2, n − 2]. If
j ≤ d(n − 1)/2e, we build a 3-branch spanning tree rooted at
node d as follows where the arrows indicate the orientation
of the routing: (1) j − 1 → j − 2 → · · · → 1 → d, (2)
d(n − 1)/2e → d(n − 1)/2e − 1 → · · · → j → d, and (3)
d(n − 1)/2e + 1 → d(n − 1)/2e + 2 → · · · → n − 1 → d. If
j ≥ d(n − 1)/2e+1, we build a 3-branch spanning tree rooted
at node d as follows: (1) j + 1 → j + 2 → · · · → n − 1 → d,
(2) d(n − 1)/2e → d(n − 1)/2e + 1 → · · · → j → d, and
(3) d(n − 1)/2e − 1 → d(n − 1)/2e − 2 → · · · → 1 → d.
Since each node has degree at least dn/2e, it is easy to see
that every node has at least one link connected to another
tree branch based on the above construction, and hence the
routing is protected. We can apply the same technique to find
a protection routing for every destination, and as a result, the
graph is protectable.
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A PPENDIX B
P ROOF OF T HEOREMS IV.2 AND IV.3
We first show that for any given k ∈ Z+ , there exists
a k-link-connected graph that is unprotectable. Let d be
the destination. Let xi , i = 1, 2, . . . , k, be nodes directly
connected to destination d. Let Gi = (Vi , Ei ) be a fully
connected subgraph where Vi = {yi,1 , yi,2 , . . . , yi,2k }. k links
are established from node xi to nodes yi,1 , yi,2 , . . . , yi,k for
i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Then node z is created so that it connects
to nodes yi,k+1 , yi,k+2 , . . . , yi,2k for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. We use
Hk to denote the final graph. The graph H3 is shown as
an example in Fig. 5(a). It is easy to see that Hk is k-linkconnected and 2-node-connected. We can argue that Hk is not
protectable as follows. Note that node z has to select at least
one PNH. Without loss of generality, suppose that its PNH is
a node in G1 . Since the graph is 2-node-connected and when
the link (x1 , d) is failed, the traffic originated at node x1 has
to use one of the nodes x2 , x3 , . . . , xk to reach the destination,
and the traffic needs to go through node z. As a result, a loop
is formed under the destination-based routing.
To prove that there exists a 3-node-connected graph that is
unprotectable, we give a counter-example as shown in Fig. 5(b)
where the destination is again denoted by d. Suppose that a
protection routing for destination d exists. First, note that if
link (x1 , d) is failed, a protection routing needs either node
y1,3 ’s PNH to be z2 or node y1,4 ’s PNH to be z1 . Similar
constraints arise from the failure of links (x2 , d) and (x3 , d).
Therefore, a protection routing requires 3 PNHs incoming to
nodes z1 and z2 . Additionally, nodes z1 and z2 totally need
2 outgoing PNHs and 2 SNHs in order to protect themselves.
As a result, 3 + 4 = 7 links are required from z1 and z2 , but
they only have 6 links. Hence, a contradiction.
A PPENDIX C
P ROOF OF T HEOREM IV.4
In the proof, we assume that nodes in a random graph in
G (n, p) are labeled {1, 2, . . . , n}, and that the notation an ∼
bn denotes limn→∞ an /bn = 1. A property A of graphs in
G (n, p) is said to exist asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) if
P (A) → 1 as n → ∞. Unless otherwise specified, log denotes
the natural logarithm.
The proof is based on a construction to find a protection
routing for every destination in a random graph. The main
difficulty in the proof is in constructing routings simultaneously for every destination such that each node is protected in
the sense that they have a suitable SNH to reroute traffic when

Fig. 6.
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Construction of a protection routing in a random graph.

their PNHs are failed. Specifically, we need to ensure that the
requirements imposed to ensure the existence of a protection
routing to a given destination d in a graph in G(n, p), do not
overly constrain the structure of the graph so as to prevent
the existence of protection routings to other destinations.
To overcome this difficulty, we use a two-round exposure
(e.g., see [4]) to construct a protection routing for every
destination. The two-round exposure means that if G1 (n, p1 )
and G2 (n, p2 ) are generated independently on the same node
set, then G1 (n, p1 )∪G2 (n, p2 ) is distributed as G (n, p) where
p = p1 + p2 − p1 p2 , with any instance of multiple links
between nodes in graphs in G1 (n, p1 ) ∪ G2 (n, p2 ) replaced
by a single link. Based on this fact, our approach is to generate
two independent, “suitable” random graphs in G1 (n, p1 ) and
G2 (n, p2 ), such that a protection routing can be constructed.
Let G1 ∈ G1 (n, p1 ) and p1 = (1 + ε1 ) log n/n where
ε1 > 0 is any constant. By a well-known result (e.g., see [4]),
a.a.s. G1 has a Hamilton cycle. In the following, we let
p2 = a log n/n where a > 0 is some constant determined
later, and generate an independent graph G2 ∈ G2 (n, p2 ) such
that a protection routing can be constructed based on a given
Hamilton cycle in G1 .
Suppose that a Hamilton cycle exists in G1 . For a destination d, we divide the Hamilton cycle into m ≥ 2 segments
(excluding destination d) where the value of m ∈ N is
determined later, and each i-th segment, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, has
gi nodes where [(n − 1)/m] − 1 ≤ gi ≤ [(n − 1)/m] + 1.
An example is shown on Fig. 6(a). Next, we introduce two
additional structures from G2 , which if present will allow the
construction of a protection routing to destination d:
• S1,d : At least one link connects destination d to a node
in each segment.
• S2,d : Each node in each segment has at least one link
connected to a node in another segment.
Sample illustrations of S1,d and S2,d are shown in Fig. 6(b),
and our goal is to demonstrate the existence of these two
structures for all destinations.
If S1,d exists, we can construct an m-branching routing
tree rooted at destination d. Furthermore, when S2,d exists,
each node has a neighbor in another segment, which provides
protection against failure. As a result, the existence of S1,d
and S2,d implies that of a protection routing for destination d.
In the remainder of the proof, we establish that a.a.s. this is
the case.
Let Xi,d = 1 if destination d has no link connected to the
previously constructed i-th segment of the Hamilton cycle,
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Pm
and Xi,d = 0 otherwise. Let Xd = i=1 Xi,d , and note that
if Xd = 0, then S1,d exists. Because E (Xi,d ) = P (Xi,d = 1),
hence
Xm
Xm
g
(1 − p2 ) i
E (Xi,d ) =
E (Xd ) =
i=1

i=1

n/m

∼ m(1 − p2 )
≤ m exp (−p2 n/m) . (4)
Pn
Let Yd =
i=1,i6=d Yi,d where Yi,d = 1 if node i 6= d
has no link connected to a node in another segment, and
Yi,d = 0 otherwise. If Yd = 0, then S2,d exists. First, note
that the total number of nodes in any m − 1 segments is at
least {(n − 1)/m − 1} {m − 1}, so the probability that a node
i 6= d has no link connected to a node in another segment is
{(n−1)/m−1}{m−1}
at most (1 − p2 )
, and hence
Xn
{(n−1)/m−1}{m−1}
E
(Y
)
≤
n(1
− p2 )
E (Yd ) =
i,d
i=1
i6=d

≤ n exp {−p2 (n − 1) (1 − 1/m) + p2 m}
∼ n exp {−p2 n (1 − 1/m)} .
(5)
Next, we investigate the existence of the constructions S1,d
and S2,d to all destinations d ∈ V . In G2 , let Zd = 1
if either S1,d or S2,d P
or both does not hold, and Zd = 0
n
otherwise. Define Z = d=1 Zd , which counts the number of
destinations without a protection routing based on the above
construction. Note that by Markov inequality,
P (Zd = 1) = P (Xd + Yd ≥ 1) ≤ E (Xd ) + E (Yd ) . (6)
Then, using Markov inequality with Eqs. (4) and (5), we have
P (Z = 0) = 1 − P (Z ≥ 1) ≥ 1 − E (Z)
=

1 − nP (Zd = 1) ≥ 1 − nE (Xd ) − nE (Yd )

≥ 1 − nm exp (−p2 n/m)
−n2 exp {−p2 n (1 − 1/m)} .
(7)
To ensure that every destination has a protection routing,
i.e., P (Z = 0) → 1 as n → ∞, Eq. (7) needs the following
two conditions as n → ∞:
log n − p2 n/m → −∞ ⇒ a > m
(8)
2
2 log n − p2 n (1 − 1/m) → −∞ ⇒ a >
(9)
1 − 1/m
Because the value of a should be kept as small as possible,
we pick m = 3 and hence a = 3 + ε2 , where ε2 > 0 is
any constant. As a result, G2 should be generated using p2 =
(3 + ε2 ) log n/n.
Thus, using the two-round exposure, a.a.s. G (n, p) =
G1 (n, p1 ) ∪ G2 (n, p2 ), where p = (4 + ε) log n/n and ε > 0
is any constant, has a protection routing for all n destinations.
A PPENDIX D
P ROOF OF T HEOREM IV.5 FOR THE PR PROBLEM
This appendix establishes that the PR problem is NPcomplete using a reduction from the 3SAT problem. As before,
we use d to denote the destination. First, note that one can
verify whether a given routing destined to node d is protected
in a polynomial time. Thus, the PR problem is in NP.
Assume the 3SAT problem consists of n boolean variables, u1 , u2 , . . . , un , whose complements are denoted by
ū1 , ū2 , . . . , ūn respectively. Let U = {u1 , ū1 , . . . , un , ūn }.
The boolean equation of the 3SAT problem consists of m
clauses, i.e., B = C1 C2 · · · Cm where Cj = xj + yj + zj and

xj , yj , zj ∈ U for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m. We build a graph G0 to
represent B, and show that the 3SAT problem has a solution
if and only if G0 has a protection routing destined to node
d. The construction of G0 involves a combination of squares,
switches and connectors, which are shown in Fig. 7(a) and
detailed below.
Each clause Cj , j = 1, 2, . . . , m, is associated with what we
term a Cj -square that consists of a four-node mesh topology
(see Fig. 7(a)), where each node has one outgoing link. One of
those links is connected to destination d, and the other three
links are associated with one of the three boolean variables
xj , yj and zj of clause Cj .
Observation D.1 A Cj -square is protected if it has at least
two outgoing PNHs.
The function of a Cj -square is to capture whether clause
Cj is true or not. When clause Cj is true, at least one of its
boolean variables must be true. This is represented by having
the corresponding link, i.e., the link with associated variable
xj , yj or zj , assigned to be an outgoing PNH. In other words,
the boolean variable is true if and only if the link it has been
assigned to is an outgoing PNH.
The next building block is a graph component called a ui switch, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The structure of a ui -switch is shown
in Fig. 7(a), where links a and b are outgoing. The function
of the ui -switch is to represent the boolean variable ui .
Observation D.2 To make a ui -switch protected, the routing
must result in a configuration where at least one of links a or
b is an outgoing PNH.
The key feature of a ui -switch, as highlighted in Observation D.2, is that it can be used to couple the boolean
assignment of ui and the routing configuration.
Next we introduce the connector building block, structured
as shown in Fig. 7(a). It has three outgoing links e, f and
g. The connector will be used to constrain the direction of
a protection routing, which will then be used in the NPC
reduction. The approach for realizing this goal is based on
the following two observations.
Observation D.3 If link e is an incoming PNH into the connector, then any protection routing for the connector cannot
also have link f as another incoming PNH into the connector
and must have link g as an outgoing PNH from the connector.
Observation D.4 If link f is an incoming PNH into the
connector, then we can find a routing to protect the connector
such that link e is an outgoing PNH from the connector and
link g is not necessarily used.
From Observations D.3 and D.4, we see that links e and
f can be used to control the direction of a protection routing (PNH assignment into and from the connector) for the
connector.
We are now ready to proceed with the construction of G0
using squares, switches and connectors so as to realize the
desired NPC reduction. The idea of the construction is to
impose some constraints on the assignments of the outgoing
PNHs of the squares, and hence the reduction can be done
by examining those resulting assignments. Each Cj clause is
associated with a Cj -square with three links corresponding to
the variables xj , yj and zj , as discussed earlier, and each of
these links is connected to a connector. Fig. 7(b) shows how
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Fig. 7. (a) Structures of square, switch and connector, and their schematic representations. (b) An example of a graph formed by squares, switch and
connectors for boolean variables ui and ūi . (c) An example of a routing configuration if ui is true. (d) An impossible configuration under ui -switch.

to connect the building blocks together for boolean variables
ui and ūi . In the figure, all the connectors on the left (resp.
right) hand side are connected to the squares with boolean
variable ui (resp. ūi ), and the connectors themselves are
connected in serial. The ui -switch is in the middle to connect
the two arrays of connectors on both sides. This construction
repeats for all boolean variables. Therefore, given the 3SAT
problem, the corresponding G0 can be constructed accordingly
in polynomial time.
Suppose that a 3SAT solution exists, i.e., each clause must
have at least one boolean variable with a value of true. Next,
we find a protection routing using the following method. In
each Cj -square, we assign the link corresponding to the true
boolean variable as an outgoing PNH. If the clause only has
one true boolean variable, we can assign the link connected to
destination d as an outgoing PNH. As a result, each Cj -square
has at least two outgoing PNHs. An example is given below.
Consider ui -switch, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and suppose that ui is
true. We assign the routing as shown in Fig. 7(c) (by Observations D.2, D.3, and D.4) where the arrows indicate PNHs and
the dotted lines denote SNHs. A similar construction can be
used if ūi is true (i.e., ui is false). In this case, the orientation
of the routing is from right to left as opposed to that of
Fig. 7(c). Hence, a protection routing can be found.
Now suppose that a protection routing exists on G0 . First,
we have the following observation.
Observation D.5 If a protection routing exists, the situation
shown in Fig. 7(d) can not happen. In other words, it is
impossible that links ui and ūi from their squares are incoming
PNHs to their connectors.
Observation D.5 can be explained as follows. If a protection
routing exists, the switch must have at least one outgoing PNH
(by Observation D.2) which points to link e of a connector.
By Observation D.3, link f of that connector can not be an
incoming PNH from a square, and link g of that connector
must be an outgoing PNH. Since the connectors are connected
in serial, the situation shown in Fig. 7(d) can not happen.
Given a protection routing, we use the following method
to find a 3SAT solution. We look at each Cj -square, j =
1, 2, . . . , m, and note that there must exist an outgoing PNH
via link xj , yj or zj due to Observation D.1. For example, if
link xj is an outgoing PNH, then we set xj to be true. By
Observation D.5, xj can be assigned true or false consistently.
After looking at all Cj -squares, if there are any remaining,
unassigned boolean variables, they can be assigned true or
false arbitrarily. As a result, each clause is satisfied and hence
B = C1 C2 · · · Cm is satisfied.
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